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This paper develops an auction design framework to study how best to measure “fair 
value” in post-merger appraisal proceedings.  Our inquiry spotlights an approach recently 
embraced by some courts benchmarking fair value against the merger price itself.  We 
show that ex ante commitment to a “Merger Price” (MP) rule tends to depress both 
acquisition prices and target shareholders’ expected welfare relative to both the optimal 
appraisal policy and other plausible alternatives.  In fact, we demonstrate the MP rule is 
strategically equivalent to nullifying appraisal rights altogether.  Although the MP rule 
may be warranted in certain circumstances, our analysis suggests that such conditions are 
not categorical, and consequently the rule should be employed with caution.  Our results 
are robust to settings where courts may err in applying conventional valuation metrics 
(such as discounted cash flow analysis), and they demonstrate why conventional 
approaches generate outcomes that skew well above the deal price—an equilibrium 
phenomenon that stems from strategic behavior (and not an institutional deficiency).  
Finally, our analysis facilitates a better understanding of the efficiency implications of 
recent reforms allowing “medium-form” mergers, as well as an assortment of (colorfully 
named) contractual terms, such as blow provisions, drag-alongs, and “naked no-vote” 
fees. 
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*
 Thanks to Scott Baker, Ryan Bubb, Jack Coffee, Steve Fraidin, Sean Gailmard, Sam Glasscock, Jeff 
Gordon, Assaf Hamdani, Steven Hecht, Rich Hynes, Wei Jiang, Charles Korsmo, Travis Laster, Minor 
Myers, Charles Nathan, John Patty, Holger Spamann, Kathy Spier, Leo Strine, Guhan Subramanian and 
Seminar Participants at Columbia Law School, the 2017 NBER Law and Economics Mid-Year Meeting, 
the 2017 American Law and Economics Association Conference, and the 2017 Society for Institutional and 
Organizational Economics (SIOE) Conference for many helpful comments and discussions.  Please direct 
additional comments to the authors, at achoi@law.virginia.edu and etalley@law.columbia.edu.  All errors 
are ours. 
Appraising the Merger Price Appraisal Rule  November 27, 2017 




In mergers and acquisitions law, the appraisal remedy affords selected target-
company shareholders the option of rejecting the terms of an approved deal in favor of a 
judicially determined cash valuation for their shares.  All states provide this statutory 
right in some form or another.
1
  When it applies, appraisal bestows on eligible 
shareholders a potentially powerful tool to opt out of terms that they believe to be 
inadequate or under-compensatory.  Although merger targets have historically faced 
appraisal actions only rarely, the strategy has grown appreciably more popular and 




Appraisal proceedings are far less popular, by contrast, among judges charged 
with distilling metaphorical mountains of financial and technical data into a “fair value” 
computation.
3
  The judge usually cannot dodge this responsibility on procedural grounds, 
cannot hand off the job to a jury, and cannot take refuge in traditional jurisprudential 
heuristics—such as evidentiary burdens of proof.  Rather, an appraisal proceeding 
allocates the burden of proof to both sides and requires the court to deliver a single 
number at the end of the process.  Testimony in such proceedings typically adds little 
solace, dominated by prolix technical reports from litigant-retained experts whose 
valuation opinions can diverge substantially.  Especially for judges who are ill at ease 




In several recent cases,
5
 the Delaware Chancery Court has dealt with this 
challenge by deploying a jurisprudential verónica
6
 of sorts—crafting a doctrine that 
largely sidesteps valuation challenges.  Specifically, the Court has proven increasingly 
                                                 
1
 Delaware limits appraisal to statutory merger transactions and for public company targets, Delaware 
further limits appraisal to deals involving mandatory non-stock consideration as well squeeze-outs.  See 
DGCL §262(b).  The Revised Model Business Corporations Act has slightly different rules that are both 
narrower and broader than Delaware’s.  See RMBCA §§13.01-02. 
2
 See, e.g., Jiang et al (2016); Korsmo and Myers (2015 and 2016), documenting the recent rise of appraisal 
actions, which grew from affecting 5% of eligible deals in the early 2000s to 20-25% by 2016, along with a 
roughly six-fold increase in aggregate monetary claims over the same period. 
3
 See, e.g., DGCL §262(h) (requiring the Court to determine the “fair value” of the shares “exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment of expectation of the merger or consolidation” and 
taking into account “all relevant factors”). 
4
 See, e.g., In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726, at 2 (“this task is made particularly difficult 
for the bench judge, not simply because his training may not provide a background well-suited to the 
process, but also because of the way the statute is constructed…[I]n reality, the ‘burden’ falls on the judge 
to determine fair value, using all relevant factors”). 
5
 See, e.g., Merion Capital v. Lender Processing Services, C.A. No. 9320-VCL (Del. Ch. Dec. 16, 2016); 
Dunmire v. Farmers & Merchants Bancorp, C.A. No. 10589-CB (Del. Ch. 2016); Merion Capital v. BMC 
Software, C.A. No. 8900-VCG (2015); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship v. CKx, Inc., 2013 WL 5878807 (Del. Ch. 
Nov. 1, 2013); In re Appraisal of Ancestry.com, 2015 WL 399726 (Del. Ch. Jan. 30, 2015); LongPath 
Capital LLC v. Ramtron International Corp., C.A. No. 8094-VCP (Del. Ch. June 30, 2015); Merlin Partners 
LP v. AutoInfo Inc., C.A. No. 8509-VCN (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 2015); The Union Illinois 1995 Investment 
Limited Partnership v. Union Financial Group, Ltd., 847 A.2d 340 (Del. Ch. 2004). 
6
 See, e.g., Angela Tung, “Them's Bullfighting Words.”  The Week (March 25, 2015); “Jose Tomas a la 
Verónica en Sevilla” (available at https://youtu.be/NZD4N7plZNQ). 
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willing to use the merger price itself as evidence (and indeed the decisive piece of 
evidence) of fair value.  The “Merger Price” (MP) rule began to make regular 
appearances in appraisal decisions towards the end of 2013, and it has been a regular 
since.  As applied thus far, the rule seems most likely to be invoked in settings where the 
transaction resulted from an arm’s length process, free from the taint of self-interest.
7
  
Several advocates and academic commentators have argued that courts should defer 
categorically to the merger price when it is the product of a reasonable and disinterested 
process.
8
  While a recent Delaware Supreme Court opinion  eschewed a categorical rule 
in favor of trial court discretion, it seemingly endorsed broad deference to the merger 




The concept underlying the MP rule is easy enough to articulate: it posits that 
“The Market” delivers the best indication of fair value,
10
 so long as the deal price is a 
product of arm’s-length negotiations between a willing buyer and a willing seller.  In 
other words, the MP rule is a natural corollary to the economic intuition that a negotiated, 
disinterested deal provides adequate pricing protection to target shareholders, and that in 
such cases market price is a better bellwether of value than a judge’s often arbitrary, 
error-prone, and inaccurate accounting. 
 
Sounds simple enough, right? 
 
Not so fast.  This paper demonstrates that the intuition underlying the MP rule—
while facially attractive—is less robust than it first appears.  Specifically, we show that 
the rule is defensible on economic grounds in case-specific circumstances that can be 
demanding, in practice, to meet; and such circumstances may be difficult to diagnose 
without the court scrutinizing the design of the sales process with vigor.  Consequently, if 
the primary benefit of the MP approach is judicial cost savings, the approach could be 
self-defeating. 
 
Our argument calls into question a central claim that purportedly animates the MP 
rule: the presumption that “The Market” operates separately and independently from its 
underlying legal environment.  On first principles alone, this presumption is suspect: for 
market outcomes and laws governing markets are fundamentally intertwined.  Markets—
particularly robust ones—amalgamate and reflect participants’ expectations about 
                                                 
7
 See, e.g., CKx, supra note 5, at 15.  
8
 See, e.g., Bainbridge et al., Brief of Corporate Law and Finance Professors as Amici in Support of 
Reversal, DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners et al. (Del. Sup. Court, Dec. 29, 2016); Appellants 
Opening Brief, DFC Global Corp. V. Muirfield Value Partners et al., No. 518, 2016 On Appeal from the 
Del. Court of Chancery, Consolidated C.A. No. 10107-CB (Del. Sup. Court, Dec. 13, 2016). 
9
 DFC Global Corporation v. Muirfield Value Partners, 2017 WL 3261190, at 2 (Del. 2017) (holding that 
the Chancery Court’s valuation approach should be upheld when there is “reasonable basis [for it] in the 
record and in accepted financial principles relevant to determining [fair] value”).  In 2010, the Delaware 
Supreme Court had similarly rejected the argument that the MP rule should be used categorically in such 
cases, but also held that the merger price was a permissible consideration in determining fair value.  Golden 
Telecom Inc. v. Global GT LP, 11 A.3d 214 (Del. 2010). 
10
 See, e.g., See, e.g., Merion Capital LP v. BMC Software, Inc., 2015 WL 6164771, at *14–16, *18 (Del. 
Ch. Oct. 21, 2015); LongPath Capital, LLC v. Ramtron Int’l Corp., 2015 WL 4540443, at *20–24 (Del. Ch. 
June 30, 2015). 
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economic conditions.  But markets also reflect participants’ expectations about the legal 
environment in which they operate.  Change that legal environment, and expectations 
change; change expectations, and market prices follow.  It is an error, therefore, to 
presume that a market price—even one produced by a robust market—is a fully 
autonomous oracle of worth, untethered to expectations related to (and affected by) law. 
 
While the interdependency of market price and legal environment is hardly 
novel,
11
 it carries particular bite in the appraisal context: for a court’s approach to 
assessing fair value affects not only what dissenting shareholders receive ex post, but also 
how the merger is priced and approved ex ante.  Indeed, the option of seeking appraisal 
can affect shareholders’ receptivity to an announced deal, because the appraisal remedy 
serves as a “reserve price” of sorts pegged at the expected appraisal value.  Under 
plausible conditions, this de facto reserve price can protect shareholders’ interests better 
than either shareholder voting alone or reliance on managerial incentives to design—and 
then commit to—a profit maximizing auction.
12
  Sophisticated buyers, moreover, would 
anticipate this effect, adjusting their bids upward to meet the appraisal reserve price, 
secure shareholder approval, and preempt widespread appraisal litigation.  To the extent 
that appraisal value is pegged against independent factors (and not the merger price), a 
prudently designed appraisal remedy can enhance value for all shareholders—even those 
who do not seek appraisal. 
 
Under the MP rule, by contrast, this reserve-price effect disintegrates.  The MP 
rule dictates that the appraisal value floats up and down mechanically with the winning 
bid, regardless of the bid’s adequacy.  Opting for appraisal, therefore, cannot yield a 
premium over the terms of the merger.  Prospective buyers, in turn, can ignore the risk of 
an outside appraisal option: for the winning bid is the outside option.  Put simply, the MP 
rule functionally vitiates the appraisal right, and whatever value enhancing implications 
the reserve-price effect portends.  So long as there exists some plausible alternative 
appraisal remedy that enhances shareholders’ ex ante welfare—even if modestly—the 
MP rule must be  suboptimal. 
 
To demonstrate our claims, we develop an auction framework incorporating 
several features of the corporate M&A environment, including agency costs, shareholder 
voting, and appraisal rights.
13
  Using this framework, we compare equilibria under 
“conventional” appraisal valuation approaches (where the valuation criteria are 
independent of the transaction price
14
) to the MP rule (where appraisal value is pegged to 
the winning bid).  We show that, for any number of bidders and under general conditions, 
                                                 
11
 For more on the circularity that ensues when market price is used to determine a legal outcome—even as 
the anticipated legal outcome simultaneously determines market price—see Talley (2006). 
12
 See, e.g., Milgrom (1987) and Grant et al. (2006) for a discussion of the practical difficulties sellers face 
in committing to a reserve price without a third party enforcement mechanism. 
13
 An auction framework is best situated to generate a “market price” that would result from competitive 
bidding.  When there is only one bidder, an English auction with a reserve price in equivalent to an arm’s 
length bargaining game where the seller makes a “take it or leave it offer” to the buyer, whose valuation is 
unknown to the seller. 
14
 Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) is the dominant practice today, but all other methods that are independent 
of merger price also qualify, such as the comparable-companies approach.  See Allen (2002). 
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the MP rule is generally not optimal (at least uniquely) and it more typically leads to 
worse outcomes for the target shareholders than other plausible approaches. 
 
The analysis informs several ongoing debates regarding appraisal litigation more 
generally.  For example, our framework predicts that in the absence of the MP rule, (a) 
shareholders seek appraisal only for deals offering relatively low premiums, and (b) fair-
value assessments will tend to skew above the deal price.  Both predictions appear to 
have empirical support.
15
  And yet, several proponents of the MP rule point to the 
upwards skew of appraisal awards as evidence of institutional dysfunction.  Our analysis 
casts doubt on such inferences: the upward skew we predict is an artifact of rational, 
strategic decision making.  (When target shareholders expect the appraisal valuation to be 
lower than the merger consideration, they will simply decline to seek appraisal.)  In fact, 
one would expect a similar upward skew regardless of whether the appraised value is set 




Our framework helps expose fundamental interactions between appraisal and 
other structural devices.  For example, a popular deal structure for public-company 
targets in Delaware—and one where appraisal is typically available—involves a 
negotiated tender offer followed by an involuntary squeeze-out merger of non-tendering 
shareholders.  Such two-step deals historically required at least 90-percent of target’s 
shareholders to tender into the first stage.
17
  In 2013, however, Delaware amended its 
statutes to allow an alternative “medium-form” merger, in which first step need secure 
only a 50-percent threshold before an accelerated squeeze out can commence.
18
  A central 
result of our analysis (Proposition 7) is that the MP rule can become optimal when the 
merger is conditioned on a strong super-majority approval of shareholders.  This insight 
suggests that courts might similarly condition their appraisal approach on the strength of 
the shareholder mandate: for instance, traditional two-step deals requiring 90 percent 
support could receive the MP rule, while “medium-form” deals requiring only 50 percent 
would fall under more conventional approaches (such as DCF). 
 
Our analysis also sheds light on several appraisal-related contractual provisions.  
For example, “drag-along” terms oblige shareholders to support a merger when a 
sufficient fraction of shareholders favors the acquisition.  “Naked no vote” terms require 
the target to pay a termination fee to the buyer should the deal be vetoed by shareholders.  
“Blow” provisions condition the buyer’s duty to close a merger on a maximal threshold 
of shareholders seeking appraisal (typically in the 10-20% range).  Each of these devices 
plays multiple roles in our model of (a) reallocating surplus between the winning bidder, 
supporting shareholders and dissenting shareholders; (b) altering the incentives of 
shareholders to support the deal; and (c) changing the characteristics of an optimal 
                                                 
15
 See, e.g., Jiang et al. (2016); Korsmo and Myers (2015 and 2016). 
16
 Moreover, our argument is also robust to adjustments that strip out buyer-specific “synergies” from fair 
value, per DGCL §262(h).  Even here, the MP rule continues to be weakly inferior to the conventional 
approach—particularly so when the target’s fair going-concern value reflects the present discounted value 
of the target’s growth opportunities (as many believe it should).  See part IIC, infra. 
17
 See DGCL §253. Falling short of 90% in the first stage did not derail the deal, but rendered it much more 
difficult to execute the squeeze-out stage quickly. 
18
 See DGCL §251(h). 
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auction design.  Our analysis suggests that drag-alongs and naked no-vote provisions tend 
to dampen deal pricing and target shareholder welfare, negating many of the beneficial 
attributes of appraisal.  Blow provisions, in contrast, plausibly entail the opposite effects: 
although a blow clearly limits the appraisal risk a buyer must bear, its triggering 
threshold implicitly mandates a supermajority condition for the deal.  As noted above, 
such supermajority conditions can substitute for appraisal, pushing merger prices and 
shareholder welfare upwards, and (potentially) justifying the MP rule. 
 
Before we proceed, several caveats to our core argument warrant elaboration.  
First, although the price- and welfare-dampening attributes of the MP rule hold for 
auctions of any size, the magnitudes of these effects attenuate as bidding becomes more 
competitive.  In the limit, as the bidder population grows arbitrarily large, the discount 
from the MP rule can become trivial.  Consequently, when the number of bidders is 
endogenous to the seller’s efforts to shop the deal, the appraisal rule can represent a 
promising incentive device.  For example, if the MP rule were available only after robust 
auctions, the seller’s deal team may have a much stronger incentive ex ante to recruit 
multiple bidders.  In such settings, shareholder welfare may well be higher when several 
bidders participate but the MP rule nullifies appraisal rights, than when relatively fewer 
bidders bid in the shadow of a conventional appraisal right.  Thus, were the MP rule 




Second, as noted above, a standard criticism of alternative valuation approaches 
(such as DCF) is that they are prone to measurement error when utilized by judges who 
are not financially sophisticated.
20
  Our analysis easily accommodates such possibilities. 
And, virtually all our arguments remain intact even when appraisal proceedings are 
subject to estimation errors, so long as courts remain unbiased overall in their approach.  
Indeed, much of the reserve-price benefit of appraisal inures to shareholders by 
enhancing buyers’ willingness to pay higher premiums ex ante, so as to win affirmative 
votes and avoid appraisal.  In the presence of judicial error, rational buyers and sellers 
acting ex ante will simply replace a known appraisal value with its expected value.  But 
with unbiased measurement errors, using expected values will have trivial effects, and 
bidding and dissenting behaviors would remain largely unchanged. 
 
Third, it is important to recognize that appraisal is one of several alternative 
mechanisms that can function as an implicit reserve price in a company auction.  Another 
is shareholder voting.  Our analysis engages this possibility explicitly, demonstrating that 
the required approval of target shareholders provides an alternative reserve price: if the 
“pivotal” shareholder views the merger price as insufficiently attractive relative to her 
valuation, the transaction will not be approved and the acquisition will fail.  The standard 
requirement of a target shareholder vote, therefore, already provides a type of reserve 
price pegged at the pivotal voter’s valuation.  That said, our model shows that 
                                                 
19
 As noted above, the Delaware Supreme Court’s recent DFC Global opinion reaffirmed the discretion of 
the Chancery Court to use a valuation approach appropriate to the facts and circumstances of each case.  
See text accompanying notes 9-10, supra. Our analysis implies courts could helpfully use their discretion to 
evaluate the adequacy of the auction process (an implication explored more fully in Talley 2017). 
20
 See, e.g., Subramanian (2017). 
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shareholder voting need not always substitute for a meaningful appraisal right in at least 
two respects.  First, voting outcomes are pegged against the preferences of the pivotal 
voter, whose preferences need not coincide with the overall firm value.  Second, voting 
can be an inherently unpredictable check on the sale process, since it can generate 
multiple equilibria that introduce coordination problems for the shareholders.
21
  Appraisal 
rights, in contrast, pose no such challenges in establishing a reserve price. 
 
Finally, although an optimal appraisal rule (as distinct from the MP rule) benefits 
shareholders as a whole, such benefits need not always be distributed evenly.  In some 
equilibria, the rising tide of appraisal lifts all boats proportionally, and the seller surplus 
from a higher deal price is enjoyed pro-rata by all shareholders.  In other equilibria, 
however, the outcome can be proportionally non-neutral, dividing shareholders into two 
groups: (i) those who seek (the more lucrative) appraisal remedy; and (ii) those who must 
remain part of the majority that votes to support the deal (disqualifying them from 
appraisal).  The egalitarian outcome tends to arise when shareholders cannot easily 
coordinate over who falls into group (i) versus group (ii).  With increased concentration 
of ownership among certain sophisticated investors, however, coordination and the 




The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows.  Section I presents a brief 
overview of related scholarship.  Section II lays out the fundamental framework we 
study, combining auction design, shareholder governance, agency costs, and appraisal.  
Section III derives equilibria of the model for various appraisal rules.  We show that 
voting and appraisal can interact in significant ways, with appraisal plausibly inducing 
strategic voting among shareholders.  We also derive our central result that the MP rule is 
usually undesirable for target shareholders.  Section IV considers a variety of extensions 
to our core model, including characterizing an optimal valuation measure for fair value.  
There we show that while the MP rule might, under the right circumstances, be one of 
many other optimal regimes, those circumstances seem implausible in most 
circumstances.  The last section concludes.  All the proofs are in the Appendix. 
 
I. Related Scholarship 
 
This section briefly reviews three relevant lines of scholarship: (1) auction design, 
(2) shareholder voting, and (3) appraisal rights.  As far as we know, ours is the first paper 
to interrelate all three dimensions.  While scholarship on auction design is vast, its 
application to merger transactions is less extensive.  Fishman (1988) shows why a buyer 
may be better off with a high, “preemptive” bid when information acquisition is costly, 
since such a preemptive bid can credibly signal to other bidders that the bidder has a high 
valuation for the target.  Cramton and Schwartz (1991) analyze two important auction 
frameworks: private independent values or pure common values among the bidders.  
They argue that the perceived legal requirement on the target company to run an auction 
                                                 
21
 Indeed, as we show below, shareholder voting can introduce multiple equilibria that cannot always be 
eliminated, even with standard “refinement” assumptions. See Section II(D), infra. 
22
 Even here, however, retail investors still fare better than under the MP rule, though the optimal valuation 
measure tends to be larger too (resulting in even less egalitarian outcomes).  See Section III(A), infra. 
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is better suited for the latter scenario than the former, because under a purely common 
value setting, the target can be sold to any buyer without any efficiency loss. Bulow and 
Klemperer (1996) demonstrate why a target company will be better off running (1) an 
auction with no reserve price but with one more bidder than (2) an auction with reserve 
price but with one less bidder.  They demonstrate the importance of inducing more bidder 
participation.  Che and Lewis (2007) examine the role of break-up fees and lock-ups in 
takeover contests and show that, when bidding is costly, break-up fees are generally more 
desirable because lock-ups tend to favor one bidder at the expense of another. 
 
There also is a small number of academic studies that examine the effect of 
shareholder voting on corporate decision-making.  Harris and Raviv (1988) examine 
different types of voting rules in the context where an incumbent and a rival compete 
over control.  They argue that one-share-one-vote regime may be optimal because the 
rule does not create a bias in favor of either the incumbent or the rival.  Stulz (1988) 
analyzes the effect of managerial control over voting rights on the probability and the size 
of a possible tender offer.  He shows that, in the context where shareholders attach 
different valuations over the company, as the manager controls more voting rights, the 
probability of a tender offer falls but the tender offer premium rises.  Bhattacharya (1997) 
examines shareholder voting issues in a proxy contest, where a dissent has to bear a cost 
to communicate its type (“good” or “bad”) to or “lobby” the pivotal shareholder.  The 
paper shows that as the communication cost falls, more proxy fights will ensue when the 
loss from electing a “bad” dissident is larger than the gain from choosing a “good” 
dissident.  Recently, Becht, Polo, and Rossi (2016) empirically examine the value of 
shareholder voting by looking at the effect on price from UK’s imposition of mandatory 
shareholder vote in certain types of transactions.  The paper finds that the shareholders 
generally gain from the imposition of mandatory shareholder voting. 
 
A third line of relevant scholarship, developed principally by legal academics, 
deals with appraisal specifically.  Kanda and Levmore (1985) review the various theories 
associated with the appraisal remedy and argue that the appraisal remedy can be thought 
of as an additional check against agency problems.  This idea plays an important role in 
this paper, too, since we argue that the manager’s incentive in selling the company will 
often diverge from shareholders’.  Thompson (1995) emphasizes the important role 
played by the appraisal remedy in giving minority shareholders an exit right.  This is 
because, without appraisal, the majority can indefinitely retain the minority investment in 
an enterprise.  Hermalin and Schwartz (1996) consider appraisal valuation in a setting 
where a majority shareholder can make an investment after a freeze-out and argues that 
the minority shareholders should be given pre-investment value of the firm.  Hamermesh 
and Wachter (2005) show how the existing Delaware case law has produced uncertainty 
in the concept of “fair value” especially when attempting to estimate the present value of 
future cash flows.  Korsmo and Myers (2015 and 2016) document the recent rise of 
appraisal litigation and argue that appraisal plays a salutary role in mergers and 
acquisitions by playing proxies for deals that may hurt target shareholders. 
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While the empirical literature on appraisal remains thin, several recent papers 
have shed additional light on the issue.
23
  Jiang, Li, Mei, and Thomas (2016) present an 
empirical investigation of appraisal remedy and show that appraisal is more likely to be 
exercised when there is a perception of conflicts-of-interest and when the premium 
offered is low.  The latter result, in particular, is consistent with our theoretical findings.  
Boone, Broughman and Macias (2017) and Callahan, Palia and Talley (2017) both 
empirically investigate whether more robust (i.e., more friendly to dissenting 
shareholders) appraisal remedy leads to a larger merger premium.  Both papers find—
consistent with our theoretical predictions—that target shareholders tend to receive 
higher premia as the strength of the appraisal remedy increases. 
 
II. The Setup 
 
We analyze the sale of a corporate entity (“target”) involving three groups of 
strategic, risk-neutral players: incumbent target shareholders, an agent (or “manager”), 
and a group of potential buyers.  Our game has four periods ( ∈ {0,1,2,3}) with no time 
discounting.  At	 = 0, corporate governance and dissenters’ rights are fixed, and the 
manager establishes an auction process.  At  = 1 , bidders privately observe their 
respective valuations of the target and participate in the auction.  At  = 2, incumbent 
shareholders may vote whether to accept the winning bid.  Should a sufficient majority 
vote in favor, the transaction closes, all shareholders relinquish their shares and the 
assenting shareholders receive pro rata portions of the winning bid.
24
  At  = 3 , 
dissenting shareholders choose between (a) similarly accepting pro rata portions of the 
bid, and (b) obtaining appraised value. 
 
We assume the target has a single class of fully-distributed (voting) stock, held by 
a countably large, diffuse group of 2 + 1  incumbent shareholders (with  ∈ ℕ  and  ≫ 0), each owning a single share of the company.  For expositional ease, we will 
describe the shareholder population as a continuum with mass 1, each holding a  ≈
 fractional share of the company.  Each shareholder places a different valuation on 
the firm as a going concern, indexed by her “type”  ∈ [, ]  with 0 ≤  <  < ∞ .  
Different valuations may be due to myriad factors, such as distinct tax positions, liquidity 
preferences, non-convergent beliefs (with wealth constraints), and so forth.  Shareholder 
type  values her ownership stake at  ∙ , and the entire firm at .  Shareholder types 
are distributed according to a commonly-known cumulative distribution function  : [, ] → [0,1]  and associated density function ℎ > 0 , assumed continuously 
differentiable for all  ∈ [, ].25 
                                                 
23
 In an earlier study, using takeover data from 1975 through 1991 and comparing appraisal-eligible and 
appraisal-ineligible cases, Mahoney and Weinstein (1999) found little evidence that appraisal eligibility 
predicted different premia. 
24
 Since dissenters must relinquish their shares, holdouts (Grossman and Hart 1980) are not as problematic 
in our model.  We assume a single-step transaction for cash, but the assumption is easily relaxed. 
25
 A special case of our framework involves identically-valuing shareholders:  = .  The assumption of 
differential shareholder valuations is intuitive and familiar.  See, e.g., Stulz (1988) (tax basis differences 
among shareholders generating different reservation values); and Brunnermeier, Simsek, and Xiong (2014) 
(players holding divergent beliefs that are common knowledge but do not converge).  When the valuation 
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Shareholders’ differential valuations naturally cause disagreement about the 
relative attractiveness of buyout bids.  To appreciate the effects of this disagreement, we 
distinguish between three shareholder types.  First is the marginal shareholder with type  = , whose willingness to accept is lowest among incumbent shareholders, and is thus 
the most willing to sell.  The marginal shareholder effectively determines trading price, 
since her value reflects the lowest asking price for the stock in the absence of a merger. 
 
Second is the representative shareholder with type % ∈ ,  , whose willingness 
to accept is equal to the mean valuation among all target shareholders: 
 
% = & ≡ ( )
)
 ∈ *, + (1) 
 
Under our formulation, the representative shareholder’s value also reflects the aggregate 
value that incumbent shareholders place on their shares under the status quo. 
 
Third is the pivotal shareholder, denoted by , ∈ ,  , who holds the swing vote 
in approving any deal.  The pivot’s turns on the threshold of shareholder approval needed 
to consummate the merger, which we denote by - ∈ [½, 1].  Conditional on a winning 
bid of /, all shareholders with  ≤ / support selling at that bid while shareholders with  > / oppose the sale.  If shareholders vote sincerely (a condition we interrogate below), 
obtaining shareholder approval requires offering a sufficiently high price /  such that / ≥ -.  Thus, with sincere voting, the pivotal shareholder is characterized by the 
condition , = 1- .26  While our framework allows the approval threshold - to be set 
at any super-majority level, we will periodically highlight the 50% point coinciding with 
the median shareholder (- = ½).27 
 
Shareholder heterogeneity implies that the marginal, representative, and pivotal 
shareholders are generally distinct.  Under our distributional assumptions, both % >  and , > , and thus the marginal shareholder ( = ) must always be the lowest valuing of 
the three.  The ordering of % and ,, however, hinges on relevant vote threshold (-) and 
                                                                                                                                                 
difference stems from heterogeneous beliefs, rather than differential tax basis, it is plausible that the 
shareholder who values the company the most would be willing to purchase the shares from other 
shareholders, so that the marginal valuation will converge to .  See Miller (1977) and Harrison and Kreps 
(1978).  However, this requires the shareholders to be not subject to any wealth or liquidity constraint. 
26
 The assumptions on ∙  guarantee that the relationship mapping from - and , is unique.  That said, as 
we show below, the pivotal voter need not always be unique with insincere voting. 
27
 Corporate law typically fixes a default at - = 0.5  (DGCL §251(c)), but there are exceptions. In 
traditional two-step acquisitions (prior to enactment of DGCL § 251(h)), the effective threshold in the first 
step was 90% (i.e., - = 0.9; DGCL § 253).  Also, under Delaware’s anti-takeover statute (DGCL § 203), 
an “interested” stockholder who acquires 15% or more a target’s cannot take control within three years 
unless it either obtains 85% of the outstanding stock at the time of first purchase or it procures a 2/3 vote of 
disinterested shareholders.  This functionally sets - = min	{0.85, 9:;< }, where = ≥ 0.15 denotes the block 
shareholder’s initial fractional purchase. 
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the distributional attributes of ∙ .  By way of example, if  is uniformly distributed and 
- = ½, we get % = , = ))  and the representative and pivotal shareholders coincide. 
 
At  = 0, the manager designs the auction process, establishing a reserve price >? ≥ 0 below which the manager refuses to sell the company.28  For ease of exposition, 
we assume that the English, ascending-bid auction is chosen.  Our model bundles 
together a variety of individual actors into the “manager” role, including corporate 
officers and directors as well as other actors who assist them with auction design—such 
as financial and legal advisers.  The manager’s behavior may diverge from shareholders’ 
interests in two critical respects.  First, we assume the manager has limited ability to 
commit to a reserve price.  Should bidding prove tepid (i.e., the highest bid falls below 
the stated reserve price), she cannot credibly commit to walk away if taking the bid 
would increase her own private payoff relative to the status quo.  Second, the manager’s 
private payoff may itself diverge from that of shareholders.  For example, the manager 
may be too reluctant to sell the company (such as when she enjoys private benefits of 
control from the status quo).  Alternatively, the manager may be too eager to sell (such as 
when the manager needs liquidity or is overly influenced by parties whose payoffs turn 
on a sale
29
).  We capture this incentive problem by assuming that the manager seeks to 
maximize the sum of (a) expected aggregate shareholder value, and (b) a private payoff 
of @ ∈ ℝ  realized by the manager in the event of a sale.  The manager’s objective 
function is thus given by Π? = ΠB + C>DEFG ∙ @ , where ΠB  denotes the expected 
payoff of shareholders.
30
  When @ > 0, the manager receives a private benefit from sale, 
making her “too eager” to sell.  When @ < 0, by contrast, the manager enjoys a net 
private benefit of control under the status quo, making her “too reluctant.”  In the special 
case of @ = 0 , the manager’s incentives are perfectly aligned with shareholders’ 
interests.
31
  We assume that @ is commonly known by all players. 
 
Finally, we assume that H ≥ 1 bidders have been recruited to participate in the 
auction.  We let H be exogenous for now, reserving for an extension the possibility of 
recruiting bidders.  Each bidder I ∈ {1, … ,H} costlessly observes its private valuation of K.  Our baseline analysis considers an independent private values (IPV) auction,32 where K  is independently and identically distributed on support [0,∞  according to a 
                                                 
28
 There may be other auction-related tasks for the manager.  We discuss an extension below of the case 
where the agent expends costly effort to recruit bidders to the auction. 
29
 See, e.g., RBC Capital Markets v. Jervis, 129 A.3d 816 (Del. 2015) (financial advisor manipulated board 
into accepting a proposed deal for which it had buy-side financing prospects); Smith v. Van Gorkom 488 
A.2d 858 (Del. 1985) (retiring CEO sold the target too cheaply and with inadequate diligence).   
30
 To avoid circularity, we omit from ΠB any components of shareholder payoff due to appraisal remedies.  
At the cost of additional notation, this framework can easily be generalized to Π? = L ∙ΠB + C>DEFG ∙@ where L ∈ 0,1 .  Qualitative results of the paper will not change. 
31
 Although it is often intuitive to assume managers categorically have net private benefits of control under 
the status quo (@ < 0), the opposite can easily hold in our framework.  A variety of golden-parachute or 
post-merger employment guarantee can skew manager’s incentives towards sale.  Also, because our 
definition of “manager” amalgamates the interests of officers, directors, financial and legal advisers, 
providers of finance, etc. under a single banner, a pro-sale skew becomes particularly unsurprising. 
32
 In the extension section, we discuss how our analysis extends to both common value (CV) and correlated 
private-value (CPV) auction settings. 
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commonly-known cumulative distribution function M , with continuously 
differentiable density function of N > 0 ∀ ∈ [0,∞ .  We also make the standard 
regularity assumption that 
1P) 
Q)  is monotone non-increasing in . 
 
For purposes of analyzing the auction, it is useful to define order statistics 
associated with buyer valuations.  Let R  denote the S’th order statistic on the H various 
realizations of K’s, where we define   as the lowest realization and T  as the highest 
realization.  One order statistic that will play a useful role is T1 , corresponding to the 
second highest realization among K’s.  In an English auction with independent private 
values, the winning buyer’s bid will be equal to the second highest realization. 
 
III. Equilibrium Analysis 
 
Having laid out the basics of the model, we now present the main equilibrium 
results.  Because our game involves a sequential extensive form game with privately 
informed players, Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is the appropriate solution 
concept.  It is important to remain mindful that both appraisal and shareholder approval 
provide potential checks on price adequacy, and they interact with each other.  To better 
understand this interaction, we first analyze appraisal rights and voting rights in isolation.  
We present four distinct cases, as shown in Table 1. 
 
 No SH Approval Right SH Approval Required 
No SH Appraisal Right A B 
SH May Seek Appraisal C D 
 
Table 1: Combinations of Shareholder Approval and Appraisal Rights 
 
Our analysis works through each combination progressively: (A) a” benchmark” 
case where neither shareholder appraisal nor approval are possible; (B) the case where 
shareholders vote whether to approve a merger, but no appraisal is allowed; (C) the case 
where individual shareholders can seek appraisal but no shareholder vote is allowed; and 
finally (D) the case where both shareholder approval and shareholder appraisal are 
available and interact with one another.  In working through cases (C) and (D), we also 
assess different valuation metrics for determining fair value, comparing the MP rule to 
the conventional rule that does not use the merger price as an input. 
 
A. Benchmark Case: Pure Auction with No Shareholder Voting and No 
Appraisal Remedy 
 
Consider first the benchmark case where shareholders have no voice whatsoever, 
and the manager has complete freedom to design and execute the sale.  As stated above, H ≥ 1 bidders participate in the auction and the manager runs an English auction: a 
commonly observed bid opens at 0, and continuously rises until the earliest moment 
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where a single bidder remains active.
33
  The equilibrium and the strategies of the auction 
are well known in the literature, and for each buyer, the dominant strategy is to stay in the 
auction until the bid surpasses his valuation K .34  The probability of a sale for H ≥ 1 
number of bidders and reserve price > ≥ 0, therefore, is Pr{WEFG|H, >} = 1 − M> T.  As 
is well-known in the literature, given the shareholders’ (reserve) valuation of %,  the 
optimal reserve price >∗ ∈ [, ], which maximizes the shareholders’ expected payoff, is 
independent of H and is given by: 
 
>∗ = % + 1 − M>∗ N>∗  (2) 
 
Note that with N∙ < ∞ and M = 1 , we have >∗ ∈ %,  .35   If shareholders could 
commit to a reserve price, >∗ would be a logical choice.  However, it is the manager who 
designs the auction process, and we get the following result: 
 
Proposition 1.  When neither shareholder approval nor appraisal are available, there is 
a unique equilibrium in which the firm is sold to the highest bid of / ≥ >?∗ , where: 
 >?∗ ≡ [E={% − @, 0} (3) 
 
Whenever @ > − 1P\∗ Q\∗ , >?∗ < >∗.  When @ > 0, the sales price can even result in a 
shareholder payoff falling short of the status quo (/ < %). 
 
The intuition behind Proposition 1 is straightforward.  If shareholders have no 
voice in monitoring the sale process, the manager will attempt to maximize her own 
payoff of Π?  in designing and running the auction.  Furthermore, the manager’s 
inability to commit to a reserve price implies that she will accept any highest bid / that 
promises more than her payoff under the status quo (/ + @ ≥ %), thereby effectively 
setting the de facto reserve price of % − @.  Whenever the manager’s private benefit from 
the status quo is not “too extreme” (@ > − 1P\∗ Q\∗  , the manager becomes too eager to 
sell and the de facto reserve price falls below the shareholders’ optimal reserve price 
(>?∗ < >∗).  When @ grows sufficiently large and positive, the manager becomes willing 
to accept a bid that could result in an expected loss to the target shareholders.  For 
instance, in the case of a single bidder and @ > %, we get >?∗ = 0, resulting in a payoff 
for target shareholders of 0 <  ≤ min	{%, ,}.36  On the opposite end, when the manager 
                                                 
33
 As is well known in the literature, in an independent and private value setting, all four standard 
auctions—first-bid, second-bid, English, and Dutch auctions—produce the same (expected) revenue for the 
seller.  This is known as the revenue equivalence principle. See Krishna (2002) at 29-36. 
34
 See Krishna (2002) and Ausubel and Cramton (2004). 
35
 The condition above is closely related to the monopoly pricing problem, where the seller sets price by 
balancing the chance of no sale against the hope of a higher winning bid (Bulow and Klemperer (1996)). 
36
 When the manager must expend effort to recruit bidders, the single-bidder case may be a real possibility, 
since one bidder is enough for the manager can secure a sale and obtain her private payoff.  In the extension 
section, we discuss the possibility where H will be endogenously determined through the manager’s effort.  
Similarly, we have assumed that the buyers do not engage in costly search to find the target company.  If 
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enjoys a “large” private benefit from the status quo (@ < − 1P\∗ Q\∗ ), she becomes too 
reluctant to sell and the de facto reserve price becomes too high (>?∗ > >∗). 
 
B. Shareholder Approval but No Appraisal Remedy 
 
Now consider the case where - ∈ [1 2⁄ , 1] fraction of the shareholders must vote 
to approve a sale, but appraisal rights remain unavailable.  As is well known in the 
political science literature, voting models with many players generically have multiple 
(infinitely many) equilibria.  The usual culprit is indifference: for any posited equilibrium 
where a clear winner emerges, no single player’s vote is “pivotal” in determining the 
outcome.  Expecting this, each voter finds herself indifferent about how to cast her 
vote—so much so that she is even willing to vote for outcomes she disfavors.  To deal 
with the multiplicity issue, we deploy a version of standard equilibrium refinement that 
involves the elimination of weakly dominated strategies.  (Duggan (2003) and Patty et. al. 
(2009))  The refinement disallows any posited equilibrium strategy _̂` for any player  if 
there exists an alternative strategy â` ≠ _̂` that fares at least as well for player  across 
every possible permutation of opponents’ strategy profiles c1` ∈ d1`, and does strictly 
better for player   in at least one such permutation.  In our framework, the weak 
dominance refinement is sufficient to generate sincere voting and a unique equilibrium.
37
  
We will refer to the set of limiting-case equilibria that remain after removal of weakly 
dominated strategies as weakly undominated equilibria. 
 
With the refinement, the preferences of the pivotal shareholder with valuation  = , begin to loom large.  In particular, if the highest bid falls short of ,, then the 
pivotal shareholder and all those of types  ≥ , will disfavor it, vote against the merger, 
and no transaction will be consummated.  Only bids that offer at least the pivotal 
shareholder’s value become feasible.  Effectively, shareholder approval introduces a 
second de facto reserve price at the pivotal shareholder’s value.  In fact, the pivotal voter 
establishes a sharper de facto reserve price to control whenever >?∗ < ,. 
 
Proposition 2.  When a fraction of shareholders of at least - ∈ [½, 1] is required to 
approve a merger but appraisal is unavailable, there is a unique set of outcome-
equivalent, weakly undominated equilibria that are revenue equivalent to an auction with 
reserve price of [E={>?∗ , ,}.  Shareholders vote sincerely, and they approve the merger 
when the winning bid is at least equal to , .  The equilibrium payoff exceeds the 
shareholders’ payoff in the absence of approval when >?∗ < , ≤ >∗. 
 
Note that the requirement of a shareholder vote can be useful to the manager too.  
By imposing an external minimum threshold price for the deal to go through, the specter 
of a shareholder vote confers on the manager additional commitment power to walk away 
                                                                                                                                                 
they need to do so, such costly search will reduce their ex ante expected return.  Providing incentive to the 
target manager to recruit potential buyers can function as a (partial) substitute for buyers’ costly search.  
See Gilson and Schwartz (2017). 
37
 When voting and appraisal are combined, however, the candidate set grows richer and multiple equilibria 
are possible where certain shareholders may vote insincerely. 
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should the highest bidder offer any less.  As is shown in the proof of Proposition 1, if the 
manger could commit to a reserve price, she would set it equal to >?∗∗ = 1P\e∗∗ Q\e∗∗ + % −@ > >?∗ .  For a manger who cannot commit to a reserve price, having the de facto reserve 
price of [E={>?∗ , ,} through the voting requirement can enhance her private return. 
 
Although the discussion above treats ,  as fixed (e.g., enshrined in the 
jurisdiction’s merger statute), there may be ample room for tailoring.  For example, the 
target’s charter might contain a “supermajority” provision, conditioning fundamental 
changes on a supererogatory level of shareholder support, even as high as , = >∗ ⟺ - =>∗ , so that even without appraisal, shareholder approval alone may be able to support 
an optimal reserve price.  Alternatively, the deal may explicitly condition closing on 
receiving a supermajority of “yes” votes or a no more than a maximal threshold of 
dissenters.  Such provisions are not uncommon in negotiated acquisitions.
38
  Here, it 
would be up to the manager and bidders to negotiate a supermajority structure described 
above; consequently, the manager’s commit constraint and skewed incentives would 
conspire to defeat such efforts without external compulsion. 
 
C. Appraisal with No Shareholder Approval 
 
Now consider the case where an appraisal option is available to shareholders, but 
there is no shareholder vote.  This scenario has practical relevance, as in the context of 
acquisitions of controlled firms or squeeze outs.
39
  Without a shareholder vote, once the 
winning bid (/ ) is determined, all shareholders may choose between (1) taking the 
merger consideration and (2) petitioning the court to determine the “fair value” of their 
shares, which we denote as g.  We assume this is paid by the winning buyer in lieu of the 
merger consideration to all petitioning, dissenting shareholders, while the non-petitioning 
shareholders are cashed out on the terms of the merger.  A key question in determining 
the equilibrium is the approach undertaken by the court to assess fair value.  We compare 
two regimes: (1) the MP rule, where, g  is pegged at the winning bid; and (2) a 
“conventional” rule, where, g is fixed through a procedure that remains independent of 
the winning bid.  We analyze each rule, in turn, below. 
 
1. The Merger Price (MP) Rule 
 
First consider the effects of the MP rule, where the fair value is pegged to the 
merger price: g = [E={>?, T1 }.  Against this backdrop, consider a shareholder of 
type  who is choosing between accepting the terms of a merger at a winning bid of / = [E={>?, T1 }  or seeking a judicial appraisal and receiving the same amount g = /.  This shareholder gains nothing from seeking appraisal over simply accepting the 
merger terms.  From the winning buyer’s perspective, there is no difference either: the 
consideration is identical regardless of the shareholders’ strategy.  The strategic role that 
the MP rule serves in equilibrium is significant: because the MP rule provides no natural 
                                                 
38
 A related provision, known as a “blow” provision, has a similar effect, allowing the buyer to back out if 
more than a critical mass of shareholders seek appraisal.  We discuss this in the extension section. 
39
 See, e.g., DGCL §253 (“short-form” merger).  The company can also have non-voting stock. 
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“outside option” to the merger price, it is not a meaningful constraint on reserve prices, 
thereby leaving such choices completely up to the agent.  The resulting strategic 
landscape, then, is identical to the benchmark case (from subsection A), where there was 
neither appraisal nor approval. 
 
Proposition 3.  When appraisal is available at an amount pegged to the merger price, 
and there is no shareholder approval, the unique equilibrium is identical to the case 
where neither appraisal nor approval were permitted (Proposition 1). 
 
Proposition 3 embodies an important intuition that merits emphasis.  At least 
when viewed in isolation, the MP rule is tantamount to eliminating the appraisal remedy 
altogether, and with it whatever price protection that it might be able to support under 
alternative forms of measurement. 
 
2. The “Conventional” Rule 
 
Now consider a “Conventional” rule in which the appraisal is pegged at some 
fixed value g, chosen by the court.  We assume for the moment that g is fixed ex ante, at 
a level commonly observed by all players.  (We later consider the case where g is subject 
to noise, such as judicial error.)  Beyond requiring that it be untethered to the winning bid 
price /, for now we remain agnostic about exactly how g is computed.  That said, several 
possibilities suggest themselves.  First, fair value might be pegged against the valuation 
of the representative shareholder: g = %.  Such a measure has some intuitive appeal, 
since it represents an aggregated measure of the target’s going-concern value over its 
incumbent owners, excluding buyer synergies (as the statute instructs
40
).  Alternatively, g 
might be pegged to the optimal reserve price that the representative shareholder would set 
in an auction.  Recall that a seller with valuation % maximizes its expected return by 
setting the reserve price at >∗ = % + 1P\∗ Q\∗ .  This measure also has some intuitive 
appeal, since a well-managed sales process would never sell to any buyer for less than 
this price.  Moreover, this measure does not reflect deal synergies from any specific 




Consider a shareholder of type  who is choosing between (1) accepting the terms 
of a merger, or (2) seeking a judicial appraisal and receiving price g.  Regardless of the 
shareholder’s type, it is clear that she would favor appraisal in all cases where the merger 
price falls below g,  and favors the merger terms otherwise.  Similar to shareholder 
voting, the Conventional rule imposes a de facto reserve price g.  The core conclusions 
from Proposition 2 follow. 
 
                                                 
40
 See, e.g., DGCL §262(h) (requiring the Court to determine the “fair value of the shares exclusive of any 
element of value arising from the accomplishment or expectation of the merger or consolidation” and take 
into account “all relevant factors”). 
41
 As discussed above, current appraisal valuation practice outside of the MP rule tends to focus on DCF 
and/or comparable companies models.  Either of these approaches is arguably consistent with several 
alternative conceptualizations of g, including those articulated above. 
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Proposition 4.  When appraisal is available under the Conventional rule in the amount g 
but there is no shareholder approval, there is a unique set of outcome-equivalent 
equilibria generating revenue equivalent to an auction with reserve price of [E={>?∗ , g}.  
Expected shareholder welfare is (weakly) greater than the benchmark case (Proposition 
1) for all g ∈ [0, >∗] , (weakly) greater than the status quo value of %  whenever 	g ∈%, >∗], and (weakly) greater than under shareholder approval alone (Proposition 2) 
when g ∈ min{,, >∗} , max	{,, >∗} . 
 
The result above is very close to that of Proposition 2, other than the replacement 
of , with g.42  The size of the shareholders’ payoff in the appraisal-only case depends 
critically on how g is set.  If the court is free (and sufficiently competent) to choose g 
near >∗, target shareholders likely fare (weakly) better under appraisal only (Proposition 
4) than when limited to approval-only (Proposition 2).  On the other hand, if the voting 
rule induces the pivotal voter , to be near >∗, the opposite can hold, and an approval-only 
regime can dominate. 
 
3. Comparison of MP and Conventional Rules 
 
With the above results in hand, we can offer a preliminary assessment of how the 
MP rule stacks up against the Conventional rule within the appraisal-only regime.  It is 
easy to see that this doctrinal battle is not very flattering for the MP rule.  As Proposition 
3 shows, the MP rule leaves target shareholders in the same position as if they had no 
dissenters’ rights.  This is problematic in at least two respects.  First, the threat of a 
conventional appraisal proceeding can help the manager to commit credibly to a higher 
reserve price.  Second, conventional appraisal tends to help target shareholders when the 
manager has limited ability or incentive to commit to a value-maximizing reserve price.  
In fact, even if a court were incompetent and unable to discern with sufficient accuracy 
any of those plausible measures, it could still (at least weakly) enhance target shareholder 
welfare beyond what the MP rule promises simply by fixing fair value at a trivially low 
level (such as $1).  Doing so would not hurt, and it night plausibly help in the case where 
management’s incentives are too skewed towards selling. 
 
The MP rule tends to suppress target shareholder value for all H , but its 
comparative disadvantage attenuates as competition grows.  To see this, consider Figure 
2, which plots the expected welfare of target shareholders (ΠB), as a function of the 
reserve price (horizontal axis) and the number of bidders (depth axis).  The figure 
assumes that the uniform distribution on the unit interval governs both the target 
shareholders’ and the buyers’ valuations.  For the sake of comparison, suppose @ ≥ %, so 
that the de facto reserve price is equal to zero.  Note the hyperplane cutting through the 
figure at the point where the reserve price is equal to > = 0.75, which is the optimal 
reserve price (>∗).  The MP rule effectively reduces the reserve price to zero, represented 
by the far-left wall of the graph.  The MP rule represents a significant hit to target 
shareholder payoffs when the number of bidders is small (e.g., in the low single digits).  
                                                 
42
 In addition, the equilibrium in Proposition 4 does not depend on restricting the strategy space with 
weakly undominated criterion, since there is no voting. 
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However, as the number of bidders increases (moving up on the depth axis), the penalty 
visited by the MP rule shrinks substantially.  While the MP rule is still worse than the 





Figure 2: Target Shareholders’ Expected Payoff as a Function of 
Reserve Price (Horizontal Axis) & Number of Bidders (Depth Axis). 
 
The intuition above extends to the general case too; it is straightforward to show 
that the marginal value of increasing >  attenuates in H , and that this marginal return 
eventually tends to zero as H grows arbitrarily large.44  Thus, in the case of appraisal with 
no voting, the adoption of the MP rule over plausible alternatives—while always 
suboptimal for shareholders in a qualitative sense—visits a somewhat limited discount on 
them in a quantitative sense with competitive bidding.  We revisit this point below. 
 
D. Shareholder Approval Combined with Appraisal 
 
Finally, consider the hybrid case where both shareholder approval is required and 
appraisal is available to the dissenters.  This is the most interesting and complex case, 
since we must consider not only the effects of both options in isolation, but also their 
interaction.  Such interaction is, in fact, a virtual certainty under current law, due, at least, 
to two key aspects.  First, under most states’ appraisal statutes (including Delaware’s), 
target shareholders are ineligible to seek appraisal if they previously voted in favor of the 
merger.
45
  In the context of our model, this implies that shareholders must vote against 
the merger to be eligible.  Second, shareholders who vote against the merger receive a 
true option—they may select whether to take the merger consideration or seek appraisal.  
                                                 
43
 Bulow and Klemperer (1996) demonstrates this effect more generally, showing that the value of a reserve 
price can be swamped by the value of adding another bidder. 
44
 For a formal proof of this claim, see Lemma A.1 in the Appendix. 
45
 See, e.g., DGCL §262(a) (appraisal available to shareholder who “neither voted in favor of the merger or 
consolidation nor consented thereto in writing”). 
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Thus, voting in favor of a merger extinguishes real option for the target shareholder, 




Accordingly, now each shareholder’s strategy consists of two elements: (1) 
determining whether to vote in favor of or against the merger; and (2) conditional on 
having voted against the approved merger, deciding whether to accept its terms or seek 
appraisal.  Unlike the case of pure approval, the combination of these factors can support 
equilibria with strategic (insincere) voting by shareholders who prefer the merger yet 
nonetheless demur to preserve eligibility to seek appraisal.  We once again start with the 
“Merger Price” rule, and then move on to several plausible “Conventional” rules. 
 
1. The Merger Price (MP) Rule 
 
As seen in the previous subsection, with the MP rule, the appraised fair value 
floats mechanically up and down with the merger price, so that, for any given reserve 
price > ≥ 0, we have g = [E={>, T1 }.  Just as before, no shareholder ever gains 
from seeking appraisal, implying that appraisal rights do not affect how any shareholder 
votes.  In this case, the game devolves into the pure approval rights case: 
 
Proposition 5.  When shareholders must approve the winning bid and appraisal is based 
on the MP rule, there is a unique set of outcome-equivalent, weakly undominated 
equilibria identical to that characterized in Proposition 2. 
 
In the pure approval regime studied above, an underlying assumption, with the 
MP rule, was that dissenting shareholders would receive the same consideration as the 
assenters.  As in Proposition 2, the winning bidder needs to, at minimum, induce the 
pivotal voter to vote in favor of the bid and the de facto reserve price is given by max	{>?∗ , ,}.  When max{>?∗ , ,} < %, it is possible for a buyer to acquire the company for 
less than its incumbent shareholders value it.  In any event, the MP rule functions largely 
to negate the effect of the appraisal remedy, leaving shareholder voting as the exclusive 
source of reserve price protection for target shareholders, particularly against the manager 
who is eager to sell the company (@ > 0). 
 
2. The Conventional Approach 
 
Now consider the Conventional appraisal remedy, in which appraisal is pegged to 
a fixed value g untethered to the merger price.  Appraisal introduces yet another form of 
reserve price on the bidding process, since a bid that falls below appraisal value is sure to 
elicit negative votes.  Whether this added reserve affects equilibrium behavior turns on 
the size of g relative to alternative reserve prices.  We analyze two critical orderings: 
 
i. Case A: g < max	{>?∗ , ,} 
 
                                                 
46
 See, e.g., DGCL §262(e) (allowing dissenting shareholder, who previously notified the corporation its 
intent to exercise the appraisal remedy, to withdraw and accept the merger consideration within 60 days of 
the completion of the merger). 
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When g < max	{>?∗ , ,} , appraisal has no effect, since it is dominated by 
alternative reserve prices.  Any approved deal would have a bid in excess of max{>?∗ , ,}, 
and no shareholder would seek appraisal, as reflected in the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 6A.  If shareholder approval and appraisal are both available and the appraisal 
remedy is pegged at g < max	{>?∗ , ,}, there is a unique set of outcome-equivalent, weakly 
undominated equilibria identical to that characterized in Proposition 2. 
 
ii. Case B: g ≥ max	{>?∗ , ,} 
 
Now consider the more interesting case where appraisal exceeds the reserve price 
established by voting and managerial bargaining: g ≥ max	{>?∗ , ,}.  A successful merger 
can now result in an appraised fair value that the pivotal shareholder would find attractive 
relative to the status quo.  Whether (and how) the shareholder responds to this incentive 
depends on the value of the winning bid /.  On one end of the spectrum, if the winning 
bid / were even higher than the appraisal value, / ≥ g ≥ max	{>?∗ , ,}, no shareholder 
would ever favor appraisal, since the terms of the merger dominate the anticipated 
appraisal award.  Here, the appraisal option does no added work, and the merger is 
supported by a strong majority (all voting sincerely).  The merger always succeeds. 
 
Suppose, in contrast, the winning bid is low: / < max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ g.  Here, the 
pivotal shareholder (the ,-type) has divided interests: appraisal looks attractive, while the 
merger price is unattractive.  The pivotal shareholder’s most preferred option would be to 
see merger consummated over her “no” vote and then to seek appraisal; and if that route 
were unavailing, she would want the merger to fail.  Either way, her optimal strategy is 
clear: she finds it weakly dominant to cast her vote against the merger.  Similar reasoning 
also applies to all shareholders with valuation weakly exceeding the pivotal 
shareholder’s.  Consequently, the merger always fails.  The reasoning from the two sub-
cases above are reflected in the following Lemma. 
 
Lemma 6B.1.  When	max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ g ≤ /, the unique weakly undominated equilibrium 
of the voting continuation game prescribes sincere voting and approval of the merger.  
When / < max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ g , the unique weakly undominated equilibrium prescribes 
sincere voting and rejection of the merger. 
 
The most interesting case is when the winning bid resides in the Goldiloxian 
middle: max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ / < g.  Here, the type , shareholder is sure to find the winning 
bid attractive, but she finds appraisal even more lucrative.  The pivotal shareholder would 
most prefer that the transaction be consummated and then to seek appraisal.  However, 
her next most preferred strategy would be for the merger to be approved and to receive 
the winning bid.  Her least preferred strategy is the outright rejection of the merger.  And 
herein lies the rub: for the type , shareholder, in order to retain eligibility for her most 
preferred outcome (appraisal), she must vote insincerely for her least preferred outcome 
(rejection).  Such an appraisal-preserving negative vote would be acceptable to the 
pivotal shareholder if she could count on other shareholders to carry the requisite 
majority (-) to override her vote. 
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But alas, all shareholders with valuations on the interval [, /] are performing the 
same strategic calculus, hoping that others will vote to support the merger so that they 
can reject the merger and seek appraisal.  For this group of shareholders, weak 
dominance no longer does any work in refining possible equilibria.  A collective action 
problem ensues, and much depends on whether merger-supporting shareholders 
coordinate on a voting equilibrium that determines who can seek appraisal, and who must 
“take one for the team” to approve the deal.  It should therefore not be surprising that 
there are multiple equilibria in this case.  Confining attention to pure-strategy equilibria,
47
 
two distinct classes of equilibria emerge in this case. 
 
Lemma 6B.2.  When max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ / < g, there are two classes of weakly undominated 
equilibria in pure strategies of the voting continuation game: 
 
(A) In the first (“uncoordinated”) equilibrium, a coalition of shareholder types l ⊂ [, /] consisting of strictly less that the needed majority - vote in favor of 
the merger, with all others voting against.  All voting against seek appraisal.  The 
merger never succeeds. 
 
(B) In the second (“coordinated”) equilibrium, a coalition of shareholder types l ⊆ [, /] comprising an exact --fraction of shareholders vote in favor of the 
merger, and all others vote against.  All those voting against seek appraisal.  The 
merger always succeeds. 
 
As Lemma 6B.2 illustrates, the appraisal interacts non-trivially with shareholders’ 
voting incentives.  When the merger price is attractive to the requisite majority of 
shareholders but the anticipated appraisal value is even more lucrative, equilibrium turns 
on whether shareholders on the interval  ∈ [0, /] can cobble together a “coalition of the 
willing” to support the merger.  If they cannot coordinate, the bid is rejected even though 
a majority of shareholders would have preferred it.  When they succeed in coordinating, 
the merger wins by a hair’s breadth, and the “no” voters (many of whom have voted 
insincerely) seek appraisal, extracting a higher expected price. 
 
Note that in the second, “coordinated” equilibrium, the buyers’ bidding strategy 
must adapt as well.  The buyer must anticipate the possibility of having to pay two 
different prices: (i) the bid amount to the assenters (the - = ,  fraction voting in favor 
and receiving b), and (ii) a premium price to the dissenters (the 1 − -  fraction voting 
against and receiving appraisal value of g > /).  The buyer’s total outlay therefore may 
exceed of the winning bid / and be equal to max	{/, -/ + 1 − - g}.  Consequently, 
buyers must prepare to adjust their bidding behavior to account for the implicit “tax” they 
pay.  Analysis of the foregoing lemmas yields the following central result. 
 
                                                 
47
 Although we cannot generically exclude mixed strategy equilibria, weak dominance excludes all 
equilibria in which players on /, ] vote for the merger with positive probability.  Moreover, of the 
remaining shareholders on o, /p, there exist no symmetric mixed strategy equilibria prescribing vote in 
favor of the merger with probability q ∈ 0,1 . See the Appendix for details. 
Appraising the Merger Price Appraisal Rule  November 27, 2017 
Page 22 of 38 
Proposition 6.  When shareholders vote on the winning bid and Conventional appraisal 
is available, equilibrium turns on the relative sizes of , and g: 
 
(A) When g < max	{>?∗ , ,} , all weakly undominated equilibria are identical to 
Propositions 2 and 5 and we have the de facto reserve price equal to [E={>?∗ , ,}.  
Winning bids are approved and no dissenters seek appraisal. 
 
(B) When g ≥ [E={>?∗ , ,}, there are two classes of weakly undominated equilibria in 
pure strategies. 
 
(1) In the first, winning bids are always at least g, and are approved without 
dissent with no shareholders seeking appraisal.  The equilibria are identical 
to those in Propositions 4, and revenue equivalent to an auction with reserve 
price g. 
 
(2) In the second, winning bids are always at least ,.  If the winning bid exceeds g,  it is approved without dissent with no shareholders seeking appraisal.  
Otherwise, the winning bid is approved by a bare - -fraction of target 
shareholders, with the remainder seeking appraisal.  The equilibrium is 
revenue equivalent to an auction with reserve price of max	{-, +1 − - g, >?∗ }. 
 
Although Proposition 6 is somewhat involved, its intuitive content is simple.  The 
appraisal rule “matters” only if it is not overshadowed by alternative types of deal price 
protection.  When g < [E={>?∗ , ,}, the appraisal option is insufficiently potent to move 
the needle, since the required vote on the merger already ensures a de facto reserve price 
of at least ,.  Here, there is no difference between the MP Rule and the Conventional 
rule: both are effectively moot. 
 
Once the appraisal value grows sufficiently large (g ≥ [E={>?∗ , ,} , equilibrium 
behavior changes significantly, pushing the de facto reserve price above ,.  How far 
above turns on which class of equilibrium emerges.  In the “uncoordinated” equilibrium 
(Lemma 6B.1), shareholders’ collective action problem causes them to reject any bid 
below g, which then becomes the de facto reserve price for the auction.  When the 
“coordinated” equilibrium (Lemma 6B.2), obtains, voting and appraisal interact.  Those 
seeking appraisal must rely on sufficiently many affirmative voters to approve the deal 
and make appraisal possible, and all shareholders voting to approve the merger 
effectively become pivotal.  Bidders’ thus expect to pay a two-part price consisting of the 
winning bid (to an --fraction of shareholders) and the appraisal value (to the remaining 1 − -).  The end result is to replicate the expected payoffs of an ascending auction with 
de facto reserve price equal to max	{-, + 1 − - g, >?∗ }.  
 
Several aspects of the equilibria described in Proposition 6 warrant attention.  
First, our model predicts appraisal will be far from ubiquitous.  When it occurs in 
equilibrium, it will be systematically pursued only in those circumstances where (a) the 
anticipated appraisal award exceeds the pivotal voter’s valuation (g > , ); (b) the 
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“coordinated” equilibrium obtains; and (c) the winning bid lies somewhere between , 
and g.  In no other cases are appraisal proceedings an equilibrium phenomenon. 
 
Second, in those cases where appraisal does occur in equilibrium, fair-value 
assessments will systematically exceed the announced merger price.  This ordering holds 
regardless of whether g  is set “too high” or “too low” as measured against some 
benchmark.  It is simply a byproduct of equilibrium behavior: strategic litigants will tend 
to pursue appraisal only when they expect it to be more attractive than the winning bid.  
Consequently, one should be skeptical about the argument that the appraisal system is 
“broken” because appraisal awards typically exceed the merger price.
48
  Such evidence 
may well demonstrate that parties are acting rationally; but it is not necessarily a 




Finally, for any fixed g ≤ >∗ , the expected revenue from the “coordinated” 
equilibrium (B)(1) is strictly less than its counterpart in the “non-coordinated” 
equilibrium (B)(2).  Target shareholders’ collective ability to coordinate can ultimately 
hurt them in the aggregate, by allowing bidders to rely on a type of judicially-mediated 
price discrimination, paying a lucrative appraisal value to dissenters but a more modest 
bid to “yes” voters.  In fact, the recent emergence of sophisticated hedge funds (such as 
Merion Capital and Elliot Associates) pursuing appraisal might signify a transition of 
sorts from uncoordinated to the coordinated equilibria, in which uncoordinated 
shareholders must more frequently carry the burden of merger approval while strategic 
and coordinated investors reap the greater benefits of dissenting and seeking appraisal.  
That said, this seemingly inequitable outcome does not in itself justify the adoption of the 
MP rule.  Indeed, a comparison of Propositions 5 and 6 reveals that regardless of the 
equilibrium that emerges, target shareholders, as a class, are at least weakly better off 
under a Conventional approach than the MP rule (at least so long as g ≤ >∗).50 
 
IV. Applications and Extensions 
 
With the equilibrium analysis in hand, we can now discuss a variety of 
applications and extensions.  We first highlight the question of designing an “optimal” 
appraisal rule, followed by a brief discussion of several other possible extensions. 
 
A. Optimal Appraisal Policy in (Possibly) Error-Prone Courts 
 
Our first application relates to a core motivation in this paper: assessing the 
conditions under which the MP rule would be an “optimal” judicial policy.  For present 
purposes, we define “optimality” as the appraisal approach that maximizes the expected 
return that the target shareholders as a whole realize in equilibrium.
51
 
                                                 
48
 See, e.g., Bainbridge (2012) and Hamermesh and Wachter (2005). 
49
 Accord Bomba et al. (2014) (asserting similar conclusions from several practitioners’ standpoints). 
50
 In fact, as we show in the next section, the optimal judicial response to the increased frequency of the 
coordinated equilibrium may be (ironically) to increase the award even further. 
51
 Although this is a natural definition for current purposes, the language of the statute does not compel the 
court to adopt it.  We thus discuss other possible welfare objectives below. 
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Proposition 7. The optimal appraisal rule is characterized as follows: 
 
(A) If [E={>?∗ , ,} > >∗, then the optimal appraisal rule is not unique and includes 
both the merger price and any fixed g ≤ [E={,, >?∗ }; 
 
(B) If [E={>?∗ , ,} ≤ >∗ , then the optimal appraisal rule is unique and 
characterized as follows: 
 1 	If the “uncoordinated” equilibrium in Proposition 6(B)(1) obtains, then 
the optimal rule fixes g∗ = >∗; 
 2 	If the “coordinated” equilibrium in Proposition 6(B)(2) obtains, then the 
optimal rule fixes g∗ = r\∗1st1s u > >∗. 
 
Proposition 7 shows, among other things, that the MP rule may be one of many 
optimal rules in certain circumstances, but only when either (a) the pivotal shareholder’s 
valuation, , = 1- , exceeds the optimal reserve price for the target shareholders (>∗); 
or (b) the manager enjoys a private benefit of control under the status quo that is “large” 
(so that >?∗ > >∗ .  When either of these conditions hold, then any fair value rule that 
renders appraisal unattractive (including the MP rule) can be optimal. 
 
This observation naturally tees up the question of when the conditions stated in 
Proposition 7 would obtain and make the MP rule defensible.  One possible circumstance 
involves mergers that require a strong supermajority of shareholders to approve.  To take 
one example, recall that two-step mergers in Delaware traditionally required at least 90% 
of the target shareholders to tender their shares into a first step tender offer before the 
squeeze-out step was permitted.
52
  This is tantamount to setting , = 10.9 .  
Proposition 7 tells us that when a merger requires supermajority assent such as this, either 
by compulsion or by the pursuit of a certain deal structure, the pivotal voter’s preference 
may provide sufficient pricing protection, and it would be optimal to relax appraisal 
standards, possibly by adopting the MP rule.  More succinctly, the MP rule is potentially 
defensible in the presence of strong super-majority mandates to approve the merger. 
 
Another possibility arises when the target’s management team enjoys relatively 
large net private benefits of control from the status quo (i.e., @ <	− 1P\∗ Q\∗ ).  Here, 
entrenchment will cause the manager to set the reserve far too high from the perspective 
of target shareholders.  In such circumstances, neither appraisal nor shareholder voting 
                                                 
52
 See DGCL §253.  As noted above, the Delaware legislature recently promulgated DGCL §251(h), 
allowing a buyer to commence with a squeeze out contingent on a bare 50% of the target shareholders 
tendering into the first step tender offer. 
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offers valuable pricing protection.  The MP rule becomes more defensible when 




Significantly, Proposition 7’s insights are largely robust to environments where 
valuation assessments are inexact or prone to considerable statistical noise (possibly due 
to judicial error).  This observation is not insignificant, since the perceived imprecision of 
conventional appraisal approaches such as DCF as applied by (putatively) inexpert judges 
is often cited as a key rationale for using the merger price (Subramanian (2017)).  Our 
framework easily accommodates such conditions.  To see why, suppose in attempting to 
implement a target valuation amount g, the court is prone to err, so that the realized 
appraisal value in litigation is g′=	g + v, where v represents a noise term independent 
of g, with zero mean and finite variance.  In this setting, both bidders and shareholders 
would predicate their strategies not on g′, but on the expected value54 of g′.  But 
because &*g′+ = g, all the results from Proposition 7 continue to go through, and the 
error term would have little net effect (so long as the noise component remains 




Finally, it is important to note that this brief discussion presumes an “optimal” 
appraisal rule to be one that maximizes target shareholders’ ex ante expected net payoff.  
While this assumption is natural within the context of corporate law, some judges could 
harbor objectives that coincide with a broader measure of social welfare.
56
  If we were to 
adapt our analysis to embrace such desiderata, it would have implications for several of 
our results.  As is well-known, the optimal reserve price in an English auction is 
analytically equivalent to a monopolist’s profit maximizing pricing condition, balancing 
the chance of failing to make an efficient sale on the margin against the reward of a 
higher price on the infra-margin.  Were we to incorporate both buyers’ and sellers’ 
expected welfare, it would be optimal to set the reserve price at >∗ = % , so that the 
company always ends up in the hands of the highest valuing player.  The key steps of our 
earlier analysis would go forward, but with the caveat of >∗ = %.  That alteration, in turn, 
would expand the circumstances under which the MP rule could be optimal by slackening 




                                                 
53
 Even with an entrenchment incentive, if the manager is subject to the Revlon duty to maximize the return 
for the shareholders, the manager may be unable to realize his/her private benefits of control.  In such a 
setting, the conventional appraisal remedy may boost the return for the target shareholders. 
54
 While this argument presumes risk neutrality, little changes with risk aversion, since the judicial noise 
affects both the buyer and dissenters, giving them a strong incentive to settle at close to expected value.  
55
 A caveat worth noting is that the option-like nature of appraisal could introduce bias if information about 
judicial error is observed after signing but before dissenters must commit to seek appraisal. Dissenters 
would then effectively own a call option over valuation risk, and it would be appropriate to reduce the 
optimal appraisal award by the value of that option. (A similar adjustment would be warranted for a variety 
of other sources of bias.)  Net of such adjustment, however, the core results in Proposition 7 remain intact. 
56
 One plausible reading of the statute, for example, might constrain a judge to award no more than the 
status quo value of the target as measured by the representative agent, %. As we discuss below, such a 
measure may also be an optimal one more generally in the case of common-value auctions. 
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B. Other Extensions 
 
There are several other extensions and applications of the basic analysis that are 
worth consideration.  The first concerns equilibrium selection.  Proposition 6 is silent on 
the question of equilibrium selection, but this issue is important, especially for the buyers 
with valuations between -, + 1 − - g  and g , who may need to decide whether to 
participate in the auction.  One possible way of confronting this issue is to identify 
situations where shareholders are likely to be able to solve their coordination problem.  A 
plausible predictor is ownership concentration in the firm.  Though we have assumed that 
the target stock is completely dispersed, this may be overly simplistic.  For many publicly 
traded companies, there are a relatively small number of institutional investors holding 
large blocs of the outstanding stock.  In that setting, the bare majority equilibrium 
(Lemma 6B.2(B)) may be easier support, compared to a setting where the shares are 
completely dispersed and the shareholders are wholly unorganized. 
 
Multiple equilibria may also pose challenges for the judges.  To deal with this 
uncertainty, the appraisal remedy might be contingent on the realized equilibrium: the 
judge may be able to “learn” which equilibrium is in play by observing the voting 
outcomes before deciding on the appraisal rule.  For instance, when the merger 
agreement sets the threshold relatively high (, ≥ >∗), there may be little need for an 
appraisal remedy that pushes that de facto reserve price even higher (with g > ,).  In 
such cases, it might be better for the court to adopt the Market Price (MP) rule, or put 
evidentiary weight on the merger price as corroborative of fair value, so as to eliminate 
possible distortion that can be caused by the Conventional rule.  This intuition suggests 
that judges might apply the MP rule when the appraisal follows a two-step merger 
involving a 90% squeeze out condition than a 50% condition.  Alternatively, if the 
shareholder vote was a close call, the judge could infer a coordinated equilibrium has 
obtained and set the fair value under the appraisal at g∗ = \∗1st1s .  If the merger proposal 
receives a robust approval, on the other hand, the judge could infer that it was an 
uncoordinated equilibrium, and set the appraisal value at g∗ = >∗.  An attractive feature 
about such a contingent appraisal system is that it awards more compensation to the 
dissenting shareholders when the merger seems more controversial. 
 
We might additionally extend the analysis by introducing judges as strategic 
players. Recall from above, the judicial attraction to the MP rule is due (in part) to the 
technical demands that alternative approaches (such as DCF) place on law-trained judges. 
Siding with the merger price effectively reduces a judge’s personal cost of generating an 
appraisal value.  And, even if the judge is aware that pre-committing to the deal price ex 
ante undermines the reserve-price effect of appraisal, it can be tempting to side with it ex 
post (after the ex ante effects have become irrelevant).  Moreover, in multi-judge 
jurisdictions, each judge’s aversion to technical difficulties in valuation can be 
compounded further by a free riding incentive—since the identity of the presiding judge 
is not determined until after a deal is closed and appraisal actions are filed. Such 
considerations might cause individual judges to be too smitten with the MP rule, even as 
they understand its bid-dampening effects.  
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Our analysis also allows us to examine a variety of different contractual 
mechanisms that respond to appraisal risk.  From the buyer’s perspective, appraisal can 
introduce transactional uncertainty.  Not surprisingly, some buyers try to reduce or 
eliminate such surprises through a variety of contractual terms.  One often-observed 
contractual clause, known as a “blow” provision, allows the buyer to walk away from the 
deal if a sufficient fraction of target shareholders exercise the appraisal remedy.  
Especially if the bare majority equilibrium is anticipated (Proposition 6), the buyer may 
have a strong incentive to adopt such a condition so as to protect itself against a cascade 
of dissenters.  A blow provision that is set at, say 20%, will allow the winning bidder to 
avoid such an outcome.  At the same time, blow provisions also implicitly condition the 
deal on a supermajority vote to consummate the deal (80% in this case).  This side effect 
may ultimately benefit target shareholders, since it requires the buyer to increase its bid 
to be attractive to a super-majority of shareholders.  Other contractual mechanisms 
include “drag-along” provisions, which require shareholders to vote in favor of the 
merger under certain conditions and lose appraisal, and “naked no vote” fees, which 
require the target to pay the buyer a termination fee in the event of a negative vote by 
shareholders.  All else held constant, our model predicts that they would tend to dilute 
bids and shareholder welfare. 
 
Another potential line of extension concerns the auction environment.  We have 
focused on the tractable setting of independent, private valuations (IPV) among the 
bidders.  This assumption may be too restrictive, but we can extend our analysis to allow 
correlation among bidder valuations: correlated private valuations (CPV) or common 
valuations (CV).  Doing so affects our analysis in several ways.  Most notably, the 
optimal reserve price in the IPV setting is relatively aggressive, but with correlated 
values, the optimal reserve price will decline towards %.57  Even in such settings, the 
traditional appraisal remedy can still play an important role when the pivotal 
shareholder’s valuation falls below the average valuation: , < %.  By setting g = %, the 
court can avoid the possibility of the target firm being sold to a buyer with inefficiently 
low valuation (, ≤ K < %).  On the other hand, when the pivotal shareholder’s valuation 
is higher than the average valuation, , ≥ %, with strong correlation in bidder valuations, 
the MP rule might be an efficient response. 
 
Finally, we have assumed throughout that the number of bidders (H) is exogenous 
and fixed a priori.  We can enrich the model by allowing the manger to recruit new 
bidders.  Such an extension would not only add richness into the auction model but also 
into the principal-agent setup.  For example, suppose it costs the manager w > 0 to attract 
a new bidder.  In that setting, an optimal appraisal rule may depend on the number of 
bidders in an interesting way: g∗ = gH  where g′H ≤ 0.  Under this structure, the 
manager would have an incentive to heat up the bidding through recruiting buyers, and 
the court would reward her efforts by progressively reducing the effective reserve price.  
                                                 
57
 If the seller does not have any information that could affect the buyer’s valuations, as the number of 
bidders grows, it may no longer be optimal to set a reserve price above the seller’s valuation (% in our 
model).  See Levin & Smith (1996) at 1279 (showing that the optimal reserve price in a correlated values 
auction converges to the seller’s true value as the number of bidders grows arbitrarily large); and Krishna 
(2002) at 121—124 (failure of the “exclusion principle”). 
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One version of this mechanism would be for the court to (progressively) revert to the MP 
rule as the number of buyers increases.  One possibility to adopt a cut-off rule, where the 
court reverts to the MP rule when the number of bidders is sufficiently high: g∗ = @C 
when H ≥ H∗ > 1 and g∗ = g otherwise.  Another possibility is to assign differential 
weights on the merger price and the traditional appraisal valuation, depending on the 
number of bidders and let the weight on the MP rule grow as the number of bidders gets 
larger: g∗ = yH ∙ @C + 1 − yH  ∙ g  where yH ∈ [0,1]  and y′H ≥ 0 .  Such 




Post-merger appraisal rights have garnered significant attention recently, due in 
part to rise of “appraisal arbitrage” by several sophisticated investors.  Responding to 
concerns about speculative petition activity, as well as the challenge of divining 
independent valuations, Delaware courts have grown increasingly amenable to using the 
merger price itself as an important lodestar for determining “fair value.”  A principal 
objective of this paper has been to evaluate whether and how adoption of the MP rule 
would affect the ex ante structuring of the sales process itself.  Our analytic framework 
(which combines auction design, agency costs, and shareholder voting) helps shed light 
on how anticipated appraisal rights and valuation protocols affect this process.  We have 
demonstrated that appraisal is an important mechanism not only in protecting the 
dissenting shareholders’ rights after the fact, but also in affecting their interests ex ante, 
by imposing a de facto price floor (reserve price) on bidding. 
 
This analytic exercise delivers several insights about when the MP rule would be 
desirable from the standpoint of maximizing welfare.  Foremost, the MP rule tends 
overall to depress both acquisition prices and target shareholders’ expected payoff 
compared to both the optimal appraisal rule and the conventional approach that sets the 
“fair value” independent of the merger price.  Our analysis has also suggested specific 
conditions under which the MP rule may be (at least weakly) optimal, such as when the 
deal is structurally dependent on super-majority shareholder approval, or when used as an 
incentive device to encourage a deal team to recruit a healthy number of interested 
buyers.  These situations square reasonably well with what appear to be the several 
contours of the MP rule as it is developing in the courts.  That said, it remains the case 
that a unique combination of circumstances would be needed to justify the MP rule over 
any number of possible conventional approaches.  Consequently, our analysis suggests 
that if the MP rule is to be used at all, it should be deployed with some caution. 
 
Beyond these insights, our model helps explain why a healthy majority of 
litigated appraisal cases using conventional fair value measures result in valuation 
assessments exceeding the deal price, an equilibrium phenomenon predicted by our 
analysis and a simple artifact of rational, strategic behavior (not necessarily an 
institutional deficiency, as some have suggested).  In addition, our analysis facilitates a 
better understanding of the strategic and efficiency implications of recent reforms 
allowing “medium-form” mergers, as well as various appraisal-related practices, such as 
blow provisions, drag-alongs, and “naked no-vote” fees. 
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Finally, the equilibrium framework developed here can be used to derive several 
concrete predictions and comparative statics, which in turn may lend themselves to 
empirical testing.  Although far beyond the scope of our enterprise here, several authors 
have begun to employ our framework to assess a variety of “shocks” that altered the 
availability or profitability of pursuing the remedy (See, e.g., Callahan, Palia & Talley 
2017; Boone, Broughman & Macias 2017).  Progress in testing predictions from our 






Proof of Proposition 1.  The proof closely follows the standard in auction theory.  For 
more detail, see the treatments by Milgrom (1987) and Krishna (2002). 
 
Suppose the manager runs an English auction with a credible reserve price of > ≥ 0 to 
maximize Π? = &DℎE>GℎzFG>	>G{>| + C>DEFG ∙ @ .  For bidder I , let } =[E={, … , K1, K, … , T}.  The cumulative distribution and density functions of } 
are ~} = M} T1 and } = H − 1 M} T1N} .  Conditional on  ≥ >, a bidder 
expects to pay [; > = > ∙ ~> +  } ∙ } })\ .  The bidder’s ex ante expected 
payment is: 
 









The total payoff for the seller is: 
 
ΠB%, >, H = 	H ∙ &){[; >, H } + M> T%
= H ∙ > ∙ ~> ∙ [1 − M> ] + ( [1 − M} ] ∙ } ∙ } }∞
\
 + M> T% 
 
When we maximize ΠB%, >, H  with respect to >, we get: 
 
ΠB; >∗, H = H ∙ 1 − > −  N> 1 − M>  1 − M>  ∙ ~>  
 
From this, a simple but helpful lemma follows: 
 
Lemma 1A: As H  increases beyond H = 1, the marginal value of setting the 
reserve price > decreases for all values of >.  In the limit, as H grows arbitrarily 
large, the marginal value of adjusting > approaches zero. 
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Proof of Lemma 1A: First, note that for all > and H > 1, 
 ΠB; >, H >H
= 1 − > −  N> 1 − M>  *1 − M> +∙ M> T11 + H ∙ ln	M>  < 0 
 
which is negative for > < >∗  and strictly positive for all > > >∗ .  A simple 
application of L’Hopital’s rule to the above expression confirms that 
 
limT→∞
ΠB; >, H >H = 0 
 
Thus, as H grows arbitrarily large, the value of setting > > 0 is fully attenuated. ∎ 
 
With a credible reserve price, given that the probability of sale is given by 1 − M> T, the 
manager’s objective function can be written as: 
 
Π?%, >, H,@ ≡ ΠB%; >, H + 1 − M> T @ 
 
Lemma 1B: If the manager can credibly commit to a reserve price, when 
maximizing her expected return, she will set the reserve price at 
 
>?∗∗ = 1 − M>?
∗∗ 
N>?∗∗ + % − @ 
 
Proof of Lemma 1B:  When we take the derivative of the manager’s objective 
function respect to >, after some simplifications, we get: 
 Π?%, >, H,@ > = H*1 − M> +M> T1 ∙ 1 − > − % + @ 
N> 
1 − M>  
 
Note that the second derivative is strictly negative for all interior >, so the interior 
root of the above equation must be a unique maximum.  This unique maximum 
occurs at when the expression in the square brackets is zero, or: 
 
>?∗∗ = 1 − M>?
∗∗ 
N>?∗∗ + % − @ 
 
When @ = 0, we get >?∗∗ = >∗.  With the assumption that 1P) Q)  is monotone and 
non-increasing in  , we see that when @ > 0 , >?∗∗ < >∗  and when @ < 0 , >?∗∗ > >∗.  Finally, as @ increases (decreases), >?∗∗ decreases (increases). ∎ 
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Now, suppose that the manager cannot credibly commit to a reserve price.  Suppose the 
highest bid from the auction is / ≥ 0.  If the manger were to sell the company, she 
realizes / + @.  If she refuses to sell, her expected return is %, which is the average 
valuation of the shareholders.  She will agree to sell whenever / + @ ≥ % or / ≥ % − @.  
The de facto reserve price is given by max	{% − @, 0}. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 2:  We start with the voting equilibrium.  Recall that the continuous 
framework presented in the text approximates for the limiting case of a finite-voter game, 
Γ, /, -;  , in which there are 2 + 1 shareholders ( ∈ ℕ and  ≫ 0), each holding 
a fractional ownership claim of ;:≈`.  Suppose that each shareholder has valuation  =  <  < ⋯ < K < ⋯ <  = , and that the winning bid is / ∈ [0,∞ .  The 
merger requires a fraction - ∈ [1 2⁄ , 1  of affirmative votes.  For any  , this is 
equivalent to requiring at least s ≥ - ∙ 2 + 1  affirmative votes.  The payoff 
shareholder of type S gets from the status quo is R ∙ , while the payoff the shareholder 
gets from an accepted bid is / ∙ . 
 
There are multiple Nash equilibria in this game, including those where the bid wins (or 
loses) by more than one vote, so that no voter considers herself “pivotal.”  The weak 
dominance refinement restricts attention to those situations where a voter views herself as 
pivotal.  For each player of type R , weak dominance requires that the probability of 
voting in favor of the deal is zero whenever 
 R ∙  > / ∙  ⟺ R > / 
 
Similarly, the probability of voting to approve the deal is 1 when R < /.  If K = /, we 
assume, without loss of generality, the shareholder votes for the merger with probability 
1.  We define the pivotal voter as the shareholder who has valuation R such that: 
 *R1+ < - ≤ *R+ ⟺ R1 < 1- ≤ R 
 
Let ∗-  denote the valuation of the pivotal voter. The reasoning above establishes. 
 
Lemma 2A: There exists a unique weakly-undominated equilibrium of 
Γ, /, -;   for all / and .  All shareholders for whom R ≤ / vote in favor of 
the merger, while all those for whom R > /  vote against.  The merger is 
approved if and only if / ≥ ∗- . 
 
Finally, consider the limiting behavior of Γ, /, -;   as  → ∞ .  Observe that lim→∞∗-  = -, and thus lim→∞ ∗- = ,.  This immediately implies: 
 
Lemma 2B: The limiting case equilibrium of Γ, /, -;   as  → ∞  is unique 
for all b.  All shareholders for whom  ≤ / vote in favor of the merger, while all 
those for whom  > /  vote against.  The merger is approved if and only if / ≥ , ≡ 1- . 
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Turning to the manager’s incentive, from Proposition 1, we had the de facto reserve price 
of >?∗ = max	{% − @, 0} .  When >?∗ ≤ , , the new de facto reserve price becomes , , 
whereas when >?∗ > ,, the de facto reserve price stays at >?∗ .  Since , > 0, the de facto 
reserve price is given by max	{>?∗ , ,}. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 3.  Let / denote the winning bid and let the appraisal price g/  be 
such that g/ = /  (the MP rule).  Conditional on the merger taking place, all 
shareholders are indifferent between accepting the merger or seeking appraisal.  
Appraisal rights therefore have no bearing on the agent’s decision choice of a reserve 
price.  The de facto reserve price is equal to >?∗ = max	{% − @, 0} as in Proposition 1. ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 4.  Suppose that the agent agrees to a merger at price /.  With no 
shareholder voting, the strategy choice for each shareholder is to choose between taking 
the merger consideration / or seeking appraisal at a “fair value” equal to g.  If / < g, 
conditional on there being a merger, the dominant strategy is to seek appraisal for all 
shareholders.  If / > g, the dominant strategy for all shareholders is to eschew appraisal 
and receive /.  If / = g, all shareholders are indifferent between accepting the merger 
terms or seeking appraisal.  As before, we assume that the shareholders accept /. 
 
Given the shareholders’ strategies, for each bidder, if she wins the auction with / < g, 
she must pay g.  When / ≥ g, she pays /.  Consequently, any bidder with valuation  < g will immediately drop out, whereas if  ≥ g, she will stay in the auction until the 
bid reaches her valuation.  This is equivalent to an auction with the reserve price of g. 
 
The equilibrium de facto reserve price is given by > = max	{>?∗ , g}.  If T < >, which 
occurs with probability M> T, the firm will not be sold.  On the other hand, if T ≥ >, 
the firm will be sold at price equal to max	{>, T1 }.  The ordering of shareholder 




Proof of Proposition 5. Suppose the winning bid is given by / ≥ 0.  Under the MP rule, 
the dissenting shareholders who exercise the appraisal remedy receive /.  Therefore, they 
are indifferent between exercising and not exercising the appraisal remedy.  Assuming, 
for simplicity, that they do not exercise the remedy, given that the shareholders get to 
vote on the merger, the equilibrium is identical to that in Proposition 2. ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 6A.  In addition to the condition g < max	{>?∗ , ,}, suppose also that >?∗ ≥ ,.  It is clear that the lowest bid that the manager would permit shareholders to vote 
exceeds g.  Consequently, any strategy involving appraisal is strictly dominated, leaving 
only the vote in question.  Under weak dominance in voting (see Proposition 2), all 
shareholders with type K ≤ / must vote in favor with probability 1, and all those with 
type K > / vote against.  But because  / ≥ >?∗ > ,, the it is clear that any bid satisfying 
the manager’s reserve must garner a greater than an - share of votes. 
 
Now suppose instead that , > >?∗ .  Here, the manager will allow all bids exceeding >?∗  to 
go to a shareholder vote.  Consider three cases. 
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Case 1: Consider a winning bid b such that >?∗ ≤ / < g < ,  and shareholder type  ∈ g, ].  Define three scenarios: (1) merger takes place regardless of the shareholder’s 
vote; (2) merger fails regardless of the shareholder’s vote; and (3) the shareholder’s vote 
is pivotal.  In the first, the shareholder’s dominant strategy is to vote against the merger 
and exercise appraisal.  In the second, the shareholder is indifferent across different 
strategies.  In the third, the shareholder’s dominant strategy is to vote against the merger 
and seek appraisal.  Hence, for all shareholders with  ∈ g, ], the weakly dominant 
strategy is to vote against the merger and seek appraisal.  The merger fails. 
 
Case 2: g ≤ / < ,.  Since / ≥ g, appraisal is a dominated strategy and can be excluded.  
Consider shareholder type  ∈ /, ].  In scenario (1), the dominant strategy is to vote 
against and not exercise appraisal.  In scenario (2), the shareholder is indifferent among 
different strategies.  In scenario (3), the shareholder’s dominant strategy is to vote against 
the merger.  The shareholder’s weakly dominant strategy, once again, is to vote against 
the merger and seek no appraisal in case the merger takes place.  The bid does not get 
enough votes from the shareholders and the merger fails. 
 
Case 3: g < , ≤ / .  Since / ≥ g , seeking appraisal is again a dominated strategy.  
Consider shareholder type  ∈ [0, ,]. In scenario (1), the dominant strategy is for the 
shareholder to vote for the merger.  In scenario (2), the shareholder is indifferent among 
different strategies.  Finally, in scenario (3), the dominant strategy is to vote for the 
merger to receive / ≥ .  The weakly dominant strategy for the shareholder with type  ∈ [0, ,] is to vote for the merger and the merger will succeed.  All shareholders receive 
the consideration of / and no one exercises the appraisal remedy.  
 
In sum, the auction is revenue equivalent to a simple auction with a de facto reserve price 
of max	{>?∗ , ,}.  The equilibrium is therefore identical to that in Proposition 2. ∎ 
 
Proof of Lemma 6B.1.  We consider the two cases in sequence. 
 
Case 1: 	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ g ≤ / .  Since g ≤ / , appraisal is a dominated strategy.  Consider 
shareholder type  ∈ [0, /].  In scenario (1), the dominant strategy is for the shareholder 
to vote for the merger.  In scenario (2), the shareholder is indifferent among different 
strategies.  In scenario (3), the dominant strategy is to vote for the merger.  Hence, the 
weakly dominant strategy for the shareholder is to vote for the merger.  Since , ≤ /, 
merger succeeds and all shareholders receive the merger consideration. 
 
Case 2: / < max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ g.  Suppose first that >?∗ ≥ ,. By construction, the manager 
credibly refuses any offer / < >?∗ , and thus there would never be a vote and the merger 
would never be consummated.  Now suppose instead that >?∗ < ,  Because / < g, all 
dissenting shareholders seek appraisal.  Consider shareholder type  ∈ /, 1].  In scenario 
(1), the dominant strategy is for the shareholder to vote against the merger and seek 
appraisal.  In scenario (2), the shareholder is indifferent across strategies.  Finally, in 
scenario (3), the dominant strategy is to vote against the merger since  > /.  The weakly 
dominant strategy for the shareholders on /, 1] is to vote against the merger and seek 
appraisal remedy.  For similar reasons, The merger will fail since / < ,.∎ 
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Proof of Lemma 6B.2.  Suppose max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ / < g .  Whenever a merger is 
conjectured certain to occur at b, all shareholders would prefer to vote against and seek 
appraisal.  That outcome is clearly not attainable.  Thus, any equilibria involving the 
approval of the merger can never have more than a bare majority in support, thereby 
making every affirmative vote pivotal.  The key issue is how the “no” votes are allocated 
among the shareholders. 
 
Consider shareholders with  > g.  For these shareholders, it is weakly dominant to vote 
against the merger, since they do not want the deal under any circumstances, and they 
would rather receive the appraisal if it does occur.  A similar reasoning applies to 
shareholders with type  ∈ /, g].  They would most prefer to see the merger approved, 
but seek appraisal, which requires them to vote against.  If that is not possible, their next 
best outcome is that the merger not approved, which also prescribes voting against.  Their 
least preferred scenario is to vote for a merger.  Thus, this group will vote against the 
merger as well.  All shareholders with γ > b will vote sincerely against the merger. 
 
Now consider the shareholders with  ≤ /, which includes  = max	{>?∗ , ,}. While all 
such shareholders would support the merger on its own terms, they would prefer to seek 
appraisal if they knew the deal would be approved.  This creates a coordination problem.  
If there were an equilibrium where all of the shareholders voted for the merger, all would 
have a strict incentive to defect and vote against and seek appraisal.  Hence, there cannot 
be an equilibrium involving approval unless votes in favor marshal an exact - fraction. 
There are infinite ways to marshal this vote, but in all of them, the relatively low-valuing 
shareholders (for whom	 ≤ /) must coordinate on a way to ration their no votes so as to 
preserve the approval of the merger.  In contrast, there are an arbitrarily large number of 
equilibria in which these low-valuing shareholders overwhelmingly vote no.  Both types 
of equilibria are robust to the elimination of weakly dominated strategies. ∎ 
 
It is also possible to show that there exists no mixed strategy equilibrium, where all 
shareholders vote in favor of the merger with a strictly positive, but less than one, 
probability, when max	{>?∗ , ,} ≤ / < g. 
 
Proof of Proposition 6.  Part (A) follows from Lemma 6A where , is the de facto 
reserve price.  The manager imposes the de facto reserve price of max	{>?∗ , ,}.  Part (B)(1) 
follows from Lemmas 6B.1.  With g as the de facto reserve price in the uncoordinated 
equilibrium, the results are identical to those in Proposition 4. 
 
Now, suppose g ≥ ,, and we are in a coordinated equilibrium.  From Lemma 6B.2, 
without any reserve price, the winning bid must be at least equal to ,.  Furthermore, 
when the winning bid / ∈ [,, g , the winner effectively pays -/ + 1 − - g.  That is, 
when / ∈ [,, g , the effective payment is between -, + 1 − - g and g.  Finally, when / ≥ g, per Lemma 6B.2, all shareholders accept the bid and the winner pays /. Consider 
three cases.  First, if >?∗ < -, + 1 − - g, given that the winning bid will never be less 
than , (and the effective payment – and thus de facto reserve price – is never less than -, + 1 − - g), the manager would never wish to push the reserve still upwards pricing 
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pressure and would thus set her own nominal reserve price no higher than ,.  Second, if >?∗ ≥ g, the manager, per Proposition 4, maximizes the return by setting >? = >?∗ .  Third, 
if -, + 1 − - g ≤ >?∗ < g, the manager would want the winning bidder to make an 
effective payment at least equal to >?∗ .  This can be achieved by choosing >? such that ->? + 1 − - g = >?∗  or >? = s >?∗ − 1 − - g . ∎ 
 
Proof of Proposition 7.  Recall, from Part II.A, that >∗ > % and >?∗  may be larger or 
smaller than >∗ depending on whether @ is negative or positive.  First, suppose , > >∗.  
Per Propositions 5 and 6, setting g > , will (weakly) reduce the target shareholders’ 
expected return.  The optimal appraisal rule is to either use the MP rule or to set g ≤ ,. 
 
Second, suppose , ≤ >∗.  Now, voting threshold is insufficiently high to maximize the 
target shareholders’ return.  The optimal appraisal rule depends on the type of 
equilibrium obtained and the manager’s private incentive.  Per Proposition 6(B)(1), in the 
uncoordinated equilibrium, g becomes the de facto reserve price.  The optimal appraisal 
rule, therefore, is to set g = >∗.  Note that when @ > 0, because >?∗ < >∗, setting g = >∗ 
will make the shareholders strictly better off in expectation. 
 
In the coordinated equilibrium, per Proposition 6(B)(2), with , = 1- , - fraction of 
the shareholders receive /  while the remaining shareholders get g .  The expected 
payment by the winning bidder is -/ + 1 − - g.  The minimum winning bid is equal to ,, in which case the buyer’s expected payment is -, + 1 − - g.  To create the de facto 
reserve price of >∗ , the court needs to set g  such that -, + 1 − - g = >∗  or, 
equivalently, g = \∗1st1s , subject to the constraint of \
∗1st
1s ≤ 1.  The optimal appraisal 
rule, therefore, is: g = min 1, \∗1st1s . ∎ 
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